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**oil extraction is the unrestricted application of technique—it elevates efficiency to an end in itself**

**KOWALSKI AND HALUZA-DE LAY 2011** (Nathan, St. Joseph’s College; Randolph, King’s University College, “Homo Energeticus: An Ellulian Analysis of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Dec 17, http://www.academia.edu/1216875/Homo\_energeticus\_Jacques\_Ellul\_on\_the\_Alberta\_Oilsands)

Ellul’s socio-historical analysis suggests that the contemporary era comprises a profoundly new human condition (Goddard, 2002). What he calls the “technical operation” is simply the fact that human beings always have had to use tools and techniques to navigate their environment (Ellul 1964, pp. 19-20). The “technical phenomenon,” on the other hand, refers to the momentous unification of the theoretical sciences (logos) and the practical arts (technē) starting in the 16th century (Grant 1986). It is only in the context of the technical phenomenonthat Francis Lord Bacon could say “Human knowledge and human power meet in one” (Novum Organon 1.3). Thus, for example, when Ellul spoke to the prospect of nuclear energy, he distinguished between scientific knowledge for its own sake, and the use of that knowledge to literally gain power: “If it were simply a matter of knowing the constitution of matter, I don’t think there would be any problem. … Unfortunately, in atomic research we are not dealing with knowledge, so much as manipulation, transformation and disintegration”. Such intricate understanding of the hidden workings of the physical universe have exponentially increased our ability to redirect it towards ends of our own making. Technical logic insists on doing something with knowledge; ‘unused’ or ‘uselessness’ are synonyms for negative value in our culture, as when uncut forest is considered ‘lost’ timber value (cf. Ellul 1982, pp. 115-116). The technical phenomenon thus embodies the will to power which Nietzsche saw in the history of the West: “this attitude of power and control...is the driving spirit of the technical system” (Punzo 1997, p.29). Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands instantiate this technical will to power.

Ellul’s point about technical power is that it is not evaluated according to any standards other than the limits it sets for itself. The “technical millieu,” he says, “is formed by an accumulation of means which have established primacy over ends” (Ellul 1971, p. 12). Technical means become evaluated simply from the perspective of technical means – and the only valuethat guides technical operation in our society is efficiency. To submit technology to any othervalue would be to make the technology less efficient, and ‘everybody knows’ that inefficiency isundesirable and bad.2

Of course, all of a society’s causal operations are directed to one end or another; we don’t possess petroleum fuel for its own sake, after all, but for its use, although such use is increasinglya sense of entitlement (Huber, 2009). Rather, Ellul’s point about techno-logic is that we do not (and do not feel the need to) submit these ends to scrutiny; what we use energy for is outside the realm of technoscientific and thus authoritative discourse. All ends other than technique itself are considered merely subjective or completely relative. Efficiency, by contrast, is not taken to be asubjective value; it is supposed to function the same way that ‘objective fact’ supposedly does.Scientific rationality examines the facts and, when they have been adequately determined,deliberation ceases. The purposes of human or social activity are passed over in uncriticalsilence; the only thing that we can rationally deliberate about is the most efficient mode of technical operation. Thus the pursuit of power – represented by the headlong pursuit of new extraction projects in Alberta’s unconventional oil sector – is a self-reinforcing cycle. By mystifying any other discourse, the appeal to ‘factual’ efficiency for its own sake obfuscates technological discourse as rational and without legitimate alternative: it alone is objective,disinterested and value-neutral. Overall, Ellul says that The term technique, as I use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or thatprocedure for attaining an end. In our technological society, technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity.

(Ellul 1964, xxv)The result is that technique comprises the limit of what is pragmatic and possible. Echoes of thislogic can be heard in the rationale given for Canada’s December 2011 withdrawal from theKyoto protocol, where the Federal Environment Minister said “[withdrawing] allows us tocontinue to create jobs and growth in Canada.” The minister’s reference to jobs and growth onlybolsters the implication that it would be inefficient for the country to depart from the petro-economic status quo.

But citizens are not supposed to be mindful of such technological rationality. For Ellul, the rejection of any values other than the increase of efficient causal power leads to the **naturalization of the technical** **phenomenon**. When technology functions as our environment, wetake it wholly for granted – as if its existence as is were necessary or ‘second nature’ (Ellul inPunzo 1997). Any uncertainty about technological hegemony is simply an inability to ‘face the facts.’ Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands are presented as necessary, socially naturalized and thus immune to any criticism other than technological fine-tuning.

The second effect of technique’s rejection of any values other than the increase of efficient causal power is that human individuals and societies must adapt themselves to the technological system, not the other way around (Ellul 1980, p. 244). The requirements of efficiency call “for a social order perfectly malleable to the demands of technique, requiring thatpolitical, economic, and educational structures be constantly open to meet these demands”(Punzo 1997, p. 23). A technological society cannot be subject to other, heteronomous values,such as those dictated by ‘tradition’ or non-technical ‘morality.’ The technical phenomenon absorbs and integrates such non technological responses, insofar as they can be fitted to the logic of the machine. According to George Graham, the “force of [Ellul’s] sociology is to show that technology permeates all human activities and prepares us through education to feel at home, soto speak, in the technological system” (p. 226). But because technique is only applicable to physical material, human beings will ultimately be treated as nothing but physical material bytechnique when they are adapted to the technical system. This is why Ellul says that technicalrationality will be applied to every field of human activity. Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands are developed such that Albertan society has to conform to the demands put on it by mining operations, and that human beings are fitted to the demands of the tar sands rather than the inverse.

**This primacy of technique turns the case and causes extinction**

**WILKINSON 1964** (John, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, forward to The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul)

It should not be imagined, however, that the universal concentration camp which Ellus thinks is coming into being in all technical societies without exception will be felt as harsh or restrictive by its inmates. Hitler’s concentration camps of hobnailed boots were symptoms of a deficient political technique. The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever desired, **except**, of course, his **freedom**. Admittedly, modern man, forced by technique to become in reality and without residue the imaginary producer-consumer of the classical economists, shows disconcertingly little regard for his lost freedom; but, according to Ellul, there are ominous signs that human spontaneity, which in the rational and ordered technical society has no expression except madness, is only too capable of outbreaks of irrational **suicidal destructiveness**.

The escape valves of modern literature and art, which technique has contrived, may or may not turn out to be adequate to the harmless release of the pent-up “ecstatic” energies of the human being. Technique, which can in principle only oppose technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems, must, in such a case, seek out other technical safety valves. It could, for example, convince men that they were happy and contented by means of drugs, even though they were visibly suffering from the worst kind of spiritual and material privation. It is obvious that *all such ultimate technical measures* must cause the last meager “idealistic” motifs of the whole technical enterprise to disappear. Ellul does not specifically say so, but it seems that he must hold that the technological society, like everything else, bears within itself the **seeds of its own destruction.**

It must not be imagined that the autonomous technique envisioned by Ellul is a kind of “technological determinism,” to use a phrase of Veblen. It may sometimes seem so, but only because all human institutions, like the motions of all physical bodies, have a certain permanence, or vis inertiae, which makes it highly probably that the near future of statistical aggregations will see them continue more or less in the path of the immediate past. Things could have eventuated in the technological society otherwise than they have.

Technique, to Ellul, is a “blind” force, but one which unfortunately seems to be more perspicacious than the best discernible human intelligences. There *are* other ways out, Ellul maintains, but nobody wants any part of them.

Ellul’s insistence that the technical phenomenon is not a determinism is not weakened by the enumeration (in the second chapter) of five conditions which are said to be “necessary and sufficient” for its outburst in the recent past, since the sufficient conditions for the conditions (for example, the causes of the population explosion) are not ascertainable.

The inertia of the technical phenomenon guarantees not only the continued refinement and production of relatively beneficial articles such as flush toilets and wonder drugs, but also the emergence of those unpredictable secondary effects which are always the result of ecological meddling and which today are of such magnitude and acceleration that they can scarcely be reconciled with even semistable equilibrium conditions of society. Nuclear explosions and population explosions capture the public’s imagination; but I have argued that Ellul’s analysis demands that *all* indices of modern technological culture are exploding, too, and are potentially just as dangerous to the continued well-being of society, if by well-being we understand social equilibrium.

**The alternative is to reject the 1AC- only this iconoclastic rejection of the ‘technique’ opens up a space for truly reasonable debate**

**KOWALSKI AND HALUZA-DE LAY 2011** (Nathan, St. Joseph’s College; Randolph, King’s University College, “Homo Energeticus: An Ellulian Analysis of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Dec 17, http://www.academia.edu/1216875/Homo\_energeticus\_Jacques\_Ellul\_on\_the\_Alberta\_Oilsands)

Kevin Garrison summarizes thus: modern techno-logic is “a continual move toward rationalizing all aspects of human life, placing those aspects within a technical sphere, and destroying all possibilities for thinking or acting outside that sphere” (2010, p. 197). Thus, inBourdieu’s terms, technique is what the entire social system takes for granted as the conditions of practical action (“ doxa ”), the universe of the undiscussed and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977, p.168).Whenever the technical system seems to be flawed or disagreeable in some manner, the only conceivable option is to view these problems as technical problems that technical progress will eventually solve. 3 Faith in future technology as a salvific force reinforces the prior conviction that technology is sacrosanct and cannot be in any way dispensed with. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands are presented as untouchable and therefore may only becorrected by further technical remediation. It is in this way that Ellul’s theory of techniqueamounts to the (in)famous claim that technology is autonomous . Ellul’s sociological analyses exhibit a tension between the way the society actually is, the way it wants to be, and the way itwill be if current trajectories are maintained. Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands are sold to Albertan society in terms of inevitability and irresistibility, when this is, in fact, not true.

In the end, the point of Ellul’s analysis is that techno-logic is an idea of our own thatnevertheless controls us. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands impose demands on societythat are accepted by both Albertan voters and the politicians that reiterate those demands, and thus their development is carried out as if we had no choice in the matter. In the end, however, Ellul is not the pessimist he is made out to be by critics. In spite of places where he decries atechnological tyranny, Ellul’s theological writings develop the hope that he has in the face of his sociology of technology. Put simply, he declares “we must destroy the deified religious character of technique” (Ellul 1981?, p. 89). Borrowing from his Christian background, he advocates the iconoclastic desacralization of the falsely sacrosanct technical phenomenon. But such“[i]conoclasm is possible only to the extent that one is able to give up the religious assurances of one’s culture” (Vanderburg, in Ellul, 2004, p. 129), and only if those religious assurances are notalready built into the architecture and geography of our social environment (cf. Huber 2009, p.474). Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands should be exposed as false gods, and only after such desacralization can truly reasonable debate take place as to how their development might proceed.

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#### Immigration reform will pass—momentum

Sargent 10/30 – Greg Sargent is an opinions writer for the WaPo. He joined the Post in early 2009, after stints at Talking Points Memo, New York Magazine and the New York Observer. (“Immigration reform is definitely undead”, 10/30/2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/)

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, **putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category**. GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to.

#### The plan sparks backlash over the process of ratification, and requires Presidential involvement

**Taylor, 2013** (Phi,l E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/)

It is unclear who in the Senate objected to the agreement’s passage, but sources say it was likely out of concern for the process by which it was being passed rather than the substance of the agreement. That may stem in part from lingering uncertainty over whether the agreement is a treaty, which would require a two-thirds majority for Senate ratification, or an executive agreement, which would require implementing legislation to be passed by a majority in both chambers. Regardless, its failure was a surprise to staff on the ENR Committee who had crafted a news release in preparation for its passage but had to delete it after the agreement was blocked. According to the report by Foreign Relations Republicans, the Obama administration has yet to say whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement but appears to prefer the latter. Mexico’s Senate ratified the agreement, suggesting it was interpreted as a treaty. If it is a treaty, a formal communication would need to be sent from the president to the Foreign Relations Committee, which would trigger hearings on the matter and allow Congress to interpret any ambiguous language in the agreement. That is important, because several provisions in the treaty “invite scrutiny and clarification,” according to the committee report. “The treaty doesn’t have every detail worked out,” said Neil Brown, a former adviser to Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) who was ranking member of the committee until his retirement earlier this month. For example, one section of the agreement calls for “common standards,” but it is unclear whether that requires companies to adopt U.S. safety and environmental standards or Mexico’s, which are considered less developed. Another area of the agreement creates a dispute resolution process without saying whether the arbitration is binding, the report said. The agreement would allow joint inspections by Interior’s BSEE and the Mexican government to ensure compliance with applicable laws. Some on the Foreign Relations Committee said they were miffed that the administration did not consult with them before pushing the agreement through in the lame duck.

#### Political capital is key to get it through the House

Munro 10-24

[Neil. Politics for the Daily Caller. 10/24/13 <http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/24/obama-to-urge-immigration-increase-in-white-house-speech/#ixzz2ifJsBq9g> //GBS-JV]

Obama’s high-profile speech also reverses his long-standing effort to keep a low profile in the debate. The strategy was intended to help immigration-friendly Republicans, including Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Paul Ryan, woo GOP legislators for the amnesty and doubled inflow. The plan helped the Democrats get a bill through the Senate in June. Obama is expected to couch his East Room call for greater immigration in poll-tested and vague language that masks the unpopular aspects of the proposed rewrite. On Oct. 17, for example, Obama said the bill “would make the biggest commitment to border security in our history; would modernize our legal immigration system; make sure everyone plays by the same rules, makes sure that folks who came here illegally have to pay a fine, pay back taxes, meet their responsibilities.” ¶ In practice, the Senate bill would double immigration via various programs, and provide a staged amnesty to 11 million illegal immigrants. Overall, it would ensure the arrival of 33 million immigrants over 10 years, and double the resident pool of low-wage, university trained guest-workers to roughly 2 million.

#### The skilled workers from immigration reform solve climate change

Herman and Smith, 10

(Richard T. Herman is the founder of Richard T. Herman & Associates, an immigration and business law firm in Cleveland, Ohio which serves a global clientele in over 10 languages. He is the co-founder of a chapter of TiE, a global network of entrepreneurs started in 1992 in Silicon Valley. He has appeared on National Public Radio, FOX News, and various affiliates of NBC, CBS, and ABC. He has also been quoted in such publications as USA Today,InformationWeek, PCWorld, ComputerWorld, CIO, Site Selection and National Lawyers Weekly, Robert L. Smith is a veteran journalist who covers international cultures and immigration issues for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio’s largest newspaper. Bob grew up in Cleveland, where he lives with his wife, Cleveland Orchestra violinist Chul-In Park, and their two children, Jae, 5, and Sun-Hee, 3. He has written extensively about immigration issues and has interviewed people at all points of the immigrant experience, from undocumented field workers to hugely successful entrepreneurs, Parts of this paper were excerpted from the book “[Immigrant Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs are Driving the New Economy (and how they will save the American worker)](http://www.immigrantinc.com/)” (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) by Richard T. Herman & Robert L. Smith.  Available wherever books are sold, “Why Immigrants Can Drive the Green Economy,” Immigation Policy Center, <http://immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/why-immigrants-can-drive-green-economy>)

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future—and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. “I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a ‘green’ theme,” he said. “And it’s interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants.” It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America’s young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas, in nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. Expanding our own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and foreign-born scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab’s efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. “We can’t get researchers over here,” Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. “It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach.” Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. “The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy development,” he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what’s the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. “We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork,” he said. We need an immigration system that prioritizes the attraction and retention of scarce, high-end talent needed to invent and commercialize alternative energy technology and other emerging technologies. One idea we floated by Arvizu was a new immigrant “Energy Scientist Visa,” providing fast-track green cards for Ph.D.s with the most promising energy research, as reviewed by a panel of top U.S. scientists. Arvizu enthusiastically responded, “Wow, that’s a brilliant idea.” As the recent submission of the Startup Visa Act bill suggests, there’s really no shortage of good ideas of leveraging immigration to jumpstart the economy. The challenge is getting the American people to understand that high-skill immigration creates jobs, that the current system is broken, and that action is required now. Suffering an Antiquated System [▲](http://immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/why-immigrants-can-drive-green-economy#up) While unlimited H1-B visas are available to foreign workers at U.S. government and university research labs, the antiquated green-card system creates a disincentive for immigrant researchers who seek a more permanent stay and status in the U.S. Anyone coming to America from a foreign land experiences the U.S. immigration system. They seldom forget the experience. This vast bureaucracy, with tentacles reaching into myriad federal agencies, wields enormous power over the lives of people trying to follow its directives. Federal immigration authorities decide if a persecuted family can escape Congo, if a prospective college student from Germany will start the school year on time in Cleveland, or if a Honduran family separated for years will be reunited in Miami. U.S. immigration law dictates who can enter America and how long they can stay. Congress can enact new immigration policies as it deems fit—and it did so in 1986 and in 1990. But the foundation of the system remains the Federal Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1965 and 1952. The 1965 act diversified America by opening immigration to new parts of the world, but it also levied restrictions that soon become dated and counterproductive. In a manufacturing era, the act made family reunification an overarching goal, while paying relatively little attention to the migration of highly skilled workers. In fact, it imposed rigid nationality quotas on skilled immigrants. The result, critics say, is a dinosaur of a system ill-equipped to deal with the demands of a fast-changing, global economy. [CONTINUED] “Our immigration laws discriminate pretty heavily against highly talented scientists and engineers who want to come to this country and be part of our technological establishment,” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told a Congressional panel in May 2009. Of particular concern to employers and economists are two sets of quotas: one that limits the number of visas available to skilled workers, and another that limits the visas available to a nationality. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) issues about 1 million green cards per year. Also known as immigrant visas, green cards bestow permanent residency, or the right to live and work permanently in America. A green card puts one on the path to citizenship. In a typical year, the vast majority of green cards go to people sponsored by a family member already here. There is no limit to the numbers of green cards that can be issued to the spouses, parents, and unmarried children of naturalized U.S. citizens. America accepts far fewer people whose main reason for coming is to practice a profession, to pursue science, or to start a company—even if that person possesses extraordinary ability. The government is restricted by law to issuing 140,000 employment or skill-based green cards each year to applicants and their immediate family members. That’s about 15 percent of the immigrant visa pool. A chunk of green cards are set aside for religious workers and wealthy investors, so the United States actually offers 120,000 employment-based green cards each year. Within the employment visa categories, known as EB visas, are several subcategories that acknowledge skill levels. For example, 40,000 visas are designated for persons of extraordinary ability—outstanding professors, researchers, and multinational executives. Another 40,000 visas are designated for professionals with advanced academic degrees whose work will serve U.S. national interests. And another 10,000 visas are available for wealthy people who commit to investing in a U.S. enterprise and creating jobs. So, out of 1 million green cards issued in an average year, 90,000, or about 9 percent, are reserved for persons with advanced degrees, exceptional skills, or capital to create jobs. Put another way, about 9 percent of immigrant visas are reserved for high-skill immigrants—the people driving the New Economy. It’s a scant amount in the context of a U.S. labor force of 154 million people. Should those exceptional immigrants hail from a nation whose workers are in high demand—for example, India and China—they face delays imposed by a nationality quota system. The 1965 immigration law sets per-country limits on employment visas. People from any one nation cannot use more than 7 percent of the visas available that year. This means that workers from large sending countries are forced to wait, sometimes more than 8 years, because their visa allotment has been “oversubscribed” by their fellow citizens. The 7 percent quota applies equally to every nation on Earth, regardless of its size or the potential number of immigrants it sends to America. For example, Malawi, which has a population of 10.5 million people, is allocated the same amount of employment visas as India, which has a population of over 1 billion. In any given year, only 5,600 green cards are reserved for Indians with advanced academic degrees or extraordinary ability, the same number available to nationals of Malawi. Congress has sought to circumvent the quotas and respond to industry demands—especially in high technology—with guest worker visas like the H1-B, a source of some controversy. The H-1B is a temporary visa for a professional offered a job by a U.S. company that agrees to pay the prevailing market wage. Only 65,000 regular H-1B visas are available each year, a quota set in the early 1990s and temporarily increased to 195,000 from 2001 to 2003. Many employers say the cap is set too low to meet their needs, especially as they seek to staff engineering and software positions. Some lawmakers would like to help them with a higher quota. These skilled immigrants often come to America as students, then go to work in growing industries. A 2008 study by the National Foundation for American Policy found that for each worker hired on an H-1B visa, at least five new jobs were created. But many labor groups argue that the cap is already set too high. Only a bachelor’s degree is required to qualify for this visa, and critics charge the H-1B visas crowd skilled Americans out of the workplace, suppress wages, and make it easier for employers to outsource jobs to low-cost countries like India. Even immigrant advocates criticize the H-1B as a second-class visa that produces an anxious life. Tied to their employers, the guest workers cannot switch jobs unless their new employer is willing to sponsor their visa, and their spouses are not allowed to work. The three-year visa can be renewed once. But after six years, the visa holder must go home unless he or she is able to get a green-card sponsor. The national-origin quotas, coupled with a limit of 90,000 immigrant visas reserved for highly skilled professionals or investors, helps to explain why so many talented immigrants—many of them H-1B visa holders—wait in vain for permission to live and work in America. Many are now leaving the U.S., or simply not coming to study or work on an H1B.

#### Climate change causes extinction – action *now* is key

Roberts 13 – citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies - 4 degree projected warming, can’t adapt - heat wave related deaths, forest fires, crop production, water wars, ocean acidity, sea level rise, climate migrants, biodiversity loss. ("If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention", January 10, 2013, [http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal](http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/~~))

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially **exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems**. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a **burned, chaotic, denuded world**, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

### Oil

**Oil prices high**

**Gulf News 9/9-“**Oil prices gain on rising fears over Syria escalation” [http://www.gulf-times.com/business/191/details/365226/oil-prices-gain-on-rising-fears-over-syria-escalation 9/10/13](http://www.gulf-times.com/business/191/details/365226/oil-prices-gain-on-rising-fears-over-syria-escalation%209/10/13) BRoche

Oil prices won support last week from fears of a US-led military strike against Syria, while commodity market traders reacted also to uncertainty over the timing of the Federal Reserve’s stimulus tapering. US President Barack Obama and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin failed on Friday to end their bitter dispute over US plans for military action in Syria, as half of the G20 called for a “strong” response to a chemical weapons attack blamed on the regime. The US signalled that it had given up on securing Moscow’s support at the UN on the crisis, as Putin reiterated a warning that it would be “outside the law” to attack without the UN’s blessing.Also occupying traders’ minds was news of disappointing US jobs growth in August, according to government data Friday. The economy added 169,000 jobs in August, the Labor Department reported, fewer than the 177,000 expected by analysts. The unemployment rate ticked down a tenth of a point to 7.3%, the lowest rate since December 2008. Many analysts said the weak August jobs report would not discourage the Fed from tapering its $85bn a month asset-purchase programme, known as quantitative easing, as soon as its September 17-18 monetary policy meeting. But some hinted that Friday’s jobs data could delay the process.“Weaker than expected US labour market data casts doubt on (the) timing of taper,” said Katie Evans, economist at the Centre for Economics and Business Research in London. OIL: Crude futures built on the previous week’s strong gains as traders continued to plough money into crude on the back of escalating tensions over Syria. Teoh Say Hwa, head of investment at Phillip Futures in Singapore, said the initial expression of support from Congress for a US-led attack had increased the likelihood of military action. This has raised concerns “that the unrest may spread in the Middle East region, which accounts for a third of the world’s crude, and disrupts oil supplies”, she told AFP. New York crude had struck $112.24 a barrel the previous week, which was the highest level since early May 2011. At the same time, Brent oil soared to $117.34 a barrel, last seen in late February.Although Syria is not a major oil producer, tr ders are nervous about a broader conflict in the crude-rich Middle East region, including neighbouring Iraq, which is becoming a major exporter. By Friday on London’s Intercontinental Exchange, Brent North Sea crude for delivery in October climbed to $116a barrel from $114.74 a week earlier. On the New York Mercantile Exchange, West Texas Intermediate or light sweet crude for September grew to $110.16 a barrel, from $108.02.

#### TBA would increase Mexico oil production from the Gulf, decreasing price on global markets

**Goldwyn 2013** [4/11; David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC; “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf]

 Mexico has been a long time reliable supplier, but its oil production has been falling steadily   since 2004. Due to constitutional constraints, foreign involvement in upstream development and   ownership of resources has been strictly limited. In 2008 minor reforms were undertaken that   loosened those restrictions, granting PEMEX greater autonomy and making it possible for some   private participation in exploration and production through incentive-based contracts with foreign   oil companies, but the impact was minimal and production has continued to fall. In 2011,   PEMEX announced the first production licensing round in Mexico in over 70 years, with 20   blocks noted for international bidders.25 For a number of years, analysts have noted that unless   the Mexican government dramatically increases the amount of PEMEX earnings it can keep for   capital investment (in 2004 PEMEX paid the government 60% of its revenues), the company   would have significant difficulties in maintaining production, not to mention expanding into more   technically complex and diverse resources. Mexico has enormous oil potential on its side of the   Gulf of Mexico and a change in policy could both change global oil markets and create a   formidable source of wealth for development of the country itself.  Change appears to be forthcoming for Mexico. In 2012 Mexico ratified the US-Mexico Transboundary Agreement that would permit foreign investment in the Mexican Gulf of Mexico if a   trans-boundary reservoir were to be found, and if companies on both sides of the reservoir wished   to cooperate. This is an effort I helped launch during my tenure at the Department of State. The   US needs to adopt implementing legislation allowing the U.S Department of Interior to   implement the agreement, and the US needs to notify the Congress, although it does not require   Senate ratification in my view. More recently, the new government of President Enrique Pena   Nieto has announced plans to undertake major reforms of the energy sector and conduct some   experimentation with Mexico’s shale oil and gas reserves. Some analysts view these reforms with  skepticism, noting that the constitutional nature of the restrictions on the energy sector may   require that any reforms are backed by a constitutional amendment, but the initiative appears to   be sincere. If the reforms are unsuccessful, the EIA estimates that Mexico, currently one of the   largest sources of oil exports to the U.S., could see its production sink as low as 1.4 mbd by 2025,   compared to 2.96 mbd in 2011. Any incremental step that Mexico can take would be helpful to   the global oil market. I am optimistic that Mexico will make significant reforms, including   constitution changes.

#### High oil prices are key to Scottish independence

THE TIMES 2011 (“Assumption on oil price could trip up Salmond,” June 23, lexis)

The price of oil has emerged as the **critical factor** in determining whether Scotland's public sector balance sheet adds up. Not only does it determine tax revenues, but it also determines how much oil and gas is extracted from Scottish waters.¶ Those calculations will become more and more politically important the closer looms the Scottish Government's planned referendum on independence, expected in 2014 or 2015.¶ Thus the political heat around yesterday's publication of the balance sheet for 2009-10 is entirely understandable, and the forerunner of what will be a central argument in the referendum itself.¶ An independent analysis of these latest Scottish tax and revenues statistics by the Centre for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) agreed with the SNP Scottish Government's assessment that once a Scottish share of oil revenues is included, Scotland is in a slightly better fiscal position than is the UK as a whole.¶ The difference is marginal, with Scotland's deficit of spending over tax (at 11.1 per cent of GDP) being better than the comparable UK deficit of 11.8 per cent. Take out oil revenues and the UK deficit of 11.8 per cent is better than the Scottish deficit of 17.8 per cent.¶ The relative positions, said the CPPR, are similar to what has been seen since 2005-06 with the exception of 2008-09 when, thanks to very high oil prices, which reached $150 per barrel, Scotland's fiscal balance was better by almost 4 per cent of GDP than the UK's public spending balance.¶ Looking forward, the CPPR reckons that the large 2008-09 Scottish deficit caused by spending on services being well in excess of tax revenues will gradually reduce. That, however is based on Treasury projections for oil revenues (£13.4 billion this year) higher than in recent years.¶ SNP ministers seem to have accepted those projections, despite the fact that they also opposed the March budget increase in offshore taxes which is partly producing the higher tax take, but which is also damaging the industry, according to Alex Salmond.¶ His real problem is that both he and the Treasury are assuming that oil prices will remain high. History, however, shows that they are highly volatile and that predicting prices is only slightly less certain that forecasting where the ball stops on a roulette wheel.¶ Research by Alex Kemp, professor of petroleum economics at Aberdeen University, has shown that if the price of oil stays high, at about $90 per barrel, then the North Sea will produce a lot of oil and tax revenues for some years to come. But if the price falls to $50 per barrel, both production volumes and tax revenues will **fall quickly** (see chart).¶ The consequences of the March increase on offshore taxes were felt pretty quickly with several oilfield development projects rapidly shelved as uneconomic. But with the North Sea now being one of the more expensive parts of the world for oil companies to operate in, the consequences of a fall in crude oil prices could have **profound effects** on political events onshore.

#### Scottish independence results in British disarm—solves prolif

FARGO 2012 (Matthew Fargo is an intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Independence for Scotland and Disarmament for the United Kingdom: Or, the Law of Unintended Consequences,” Date is date accessed, July 27, http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/independence\_for\_scotland\_and\_disarmament\_for\_the\_united\_kingdom\_or\_the\_law\_of\_unintended\_consequences/index.html)

A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation?¶ A complicating factor for the referendum is that while the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a recognized nuclear weapon state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the strategic nuclear weapons forces which it possesses are all located on submarines based in Scotland. The majority party in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish National Party, has declared that if they achieve independence in 2014, they would call for the unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland.¶ British nuclear forces are comprised solely of four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, each armed with up to sixteen Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. With ten warheads on each missile and a single Vanguard submarine deployed at a time, the United Kingdom maintains 160 operational warheads, and has declared that it will not exceed a maximum of 225 operational warheads at a given time.¶ The possibility of Scottish independence brings into serious question the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent. According to William Walker, there is no other existing submarine base in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland that would be able to host the United Kingdom’s Vanguard ballistic missile submarines. As the referendum nears and it becomes clearer whether it is likely to pass, there will undoubtedly be a more vigorous search for other basing alternatives within the U.K. Ministry of Defense and Parliament.¶ It has also been reported that an independent Scotland would find it difficult to field much in the way of a modern military force on par with countries of approximately the same size in Europe. Although the Scottish National Party has opposed the membership of an independent Scotland in NATO for years, First Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond may change course in order to ensure the future security of Scotland. Defense experts in the U.K. have speculated that Scotland would be unable to bar British nuclear submarines from its bases if it expects to become a full member of NATO.¶ Meanwhile, the United Kingdom continues to debate the wisdom of building new ballistic missile submarines at an estimated cost of £25 billion ($39.6 billion). The British American Security Information Council established an independent commission to examine the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces and found that the elimination of Trident from the military budget would save approximately £1.6 billion ($2.5 billion) annually for the next fifty years.¶ Although studies have been conducted into potential alternatives, Defense Secretary Liam Fox announced in 2011 that plans to begin a “like for like” replacement of the existing ballistic submarine force are already underway but the final decision will not be made until 2014.¶ The United Kingdom’s maintenance of continuous at-sea deterrence has existed since the 1960s, but alternatives such as creating a dual-use submarine force to replace the aging Trident system or maintaining a far cheaper non-deployed strategic force have been suggested. However, there is an even better solution – British nuclear disarmament.¶ The future of the United Kingdom’s strategic forces has been debated in Parliament in the past. Some Members of Parliament have declared that nuclear weapons “serve no useful or practical purpose” defending the United Kingdom from “the most pressing threat currently facing the U.K.” – terrorism. Furthermore, although the United Kingdom envisions its strategic forces as an independent nuclear deterrent, it continues to rely on the United States for technical support and cooperation. Defense Secretary Fox has insisted that, "Policy remains that a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile delivery system and continuous at-sea deterrence is right for the U.K." In his autobiography, former Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote that, “In the final analysis, I thought giving [Trident] up too big a downgrading of our status as a nation, and in an uncertain world, too big a risk for our defense.”¶ British disarmament would also divorce the power and prestige of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council from the possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United Kingdom would be the first Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized nuclear weapons state to fulfill its NPT Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith…to nuclear disarmament”.¶ Although this would only be a small step toward total global nuclear disarmament, it could serve as an important example for moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot rebuild ailing economies, cannot bridge cultural divides, cannot defend against terrorism, and no longer serve the national interests of the United Kingdom.¶ Let Trident rust in peace.

#### British disarm solves extinction – inevitable without it

MILNE et al 2002 (Sir Hugh Beach has served as Master General of the Ordnance of the British Armed Forces and director of the Council for Arms Control. John Finney is Professor of Physics at University College London. Previously he has been Chief Scientist at the ISIS Facility, Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, and Science Coordinator of the European Spallation Source Project. Tom Milne is a researcher at the London Office of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Sebastian Pease FRS is a physicist specializing in various aspects of nuclear energy. He is a former Director of the UKAEA’s Culham Laboratory and of the controlled fusion research programme. From 1942-46 he worked on operational research at the Headquarters of RAF Bomber Command. Sir Joseph Rotblat FRS, co-recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize, is Emeritus Professor of Physics at the University of London. He worked on the Manhattan Project “An End to UK Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.britishpugwash.org/documents/end-to-uk-nuclear-weapons.pdf)

What good has this exceptional effort done the UK? A previous British Pugwash report 2 concluded that even at the height of the Cold War, Britain’s nuclear weapons had no influence on the course of events. They deterred no enemy. An independent British nuclear force was rationalized as a “second centre of decision” that would give the Soviet Union pause should it doubt American willingness to use nuclear weapons in Europe’s defence. But at no time did the British arsenal constitute more than two per cent of the total nuclear arsenal available to NATO, and it was never reasonable to think that the UK would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in circumstances that the US would not. No allied country depended on UK nuclear weapons and no serious consideration was given to the use of these weapons in any of the wars in which the UK has been involved (Suez, Falklands/Malvinas, Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia). The report’s conclusion, that Britain could dispense forthwith with its nuclear weapons, was based not on the fact that the Cold War is over, but on the uselessness of the weapons during the entire period since the Montebello test. Subsequent events have not altered the basis for this conclusion: it holds good today.¶ Not only have UK nuclear weapons been of no military value, they are dangerous to possess. There could be accidents and at times of great international tension the weapons could attract pre-emptive strikes. Use of nuclear weapons by the UK would invite disastrous nuclear counterattack.3 And each country that retains or acquires nuclear weapons serves, directly or indirectly, as an incentive for other nations to do likewise. The UK is legally committed to nuclear disarmament, moreover, under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an undertaking reaffirmed in unequivocal language at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.¶ The current report discusses options open to the UK government in the areas of nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Chapter 2 reviews the state of the UK nuclear weapons programme, Chapter 3 addresses the prospects for multilateral disarmament, and Chapter 4 discusses existing UK disarmament policy. Because present UK public opinion favours nuclear disarmament only in conjunction with disarmament by other countries, it seems unlikely that the decommissioning of Trident could be achieved in the short run. Chapter 5 deals, therefore, with opportunities for action that, in political terms, may be more readily achievable. These are: 1. an intensification of the present policy of seeking multilateral disarmament; 2. unilateral reduction of the UK nuclear arsenal; 3. a commitment not to develop or procure a nuclear successor to Trident. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive. However, our major recommendation is option 3: that the UK government should decide and announce that no successor nuclear weapons system will be developed or procured to replace Trident when it is decommissioned in about 20 years’ time.¶ A decision not to develop a nuclear successor to Trident would be comparable in the nuclear weapons context to the decision by the UK in 1956 that it would no longer develop offensive chemical and biological weapons.4 The UK’s chemical and biological weapons facilities now concentrate their work entirely on defensive measures, including means of enforcing the international chemical and biological weapons conventions that prohibit possession of these weapons. In this way the UK has made a significant contribution to reducing the threat from chemical and biological weapons. It is our main conclusion that by taking a similar approach in the nuclear field, ending development of UK nuclear weapons and intensifying UK efforts to address the political and technical problems confronting multilateral disarmament, the UK would make a significant contribution to reducing the global nuclear threat and, in doing so, increase national security.

### China

#### China’s influence in Latin America is key to their soft power

Malik, 06 – PhD in International Relations (Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," 6/12, <http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org>)

China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa, China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global influence. China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales.

#### Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction

Zhang 2012 (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm)

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

#### Saudi Arabia has not yet acquired the bomb. Perception of US support is the key factor.

Guzansky ‘13

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Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.

Edelman ‘11

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

**Miniscule risk of south china sea war – multiple warrants**

**Moss 2-10**-2013 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009. “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true) BW

Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.

These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one.And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.

2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.

**3.** Question marks over **the PLA’s operational effectiveness**. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.

4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.

**5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention**. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).

7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.

In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.

However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.

Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.

In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

Economic ties solve

Ackerman 2011 – quoting former admiral Timothy Keating, the official blog of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association

(Robert, 5/10/11, War Between China, U.S. Not Likely, http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

So does US Diplomacy

Zhang **11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (Baohui, March/April, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,")

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that **the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely**. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

**No escalation – they can’t get their nukes off the ground before we’d destroy them**

**Lewis 05**, research fellow @ CISS & Cooperative Security Program Post- Doctorate fellow @ U of Md, 2005 (Jeffery, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No 3 Vol 61 p 52, accessed through Galileo)

So, let's review: China deploys just 30 ICBMs, kept unfueled and without warheads, and another 50-100 MRBMs, sitting unarmed in their garrisons. Conventional wisdom suggests this posture is vulnerable and invites preemptive attack during a crisis. This minimal arsenal is clearly a matter of choice: China stopped fissile material production in 1990 and has long had the capacity to produce a much larger number of ballistic missiles." The simplest explanation for this choice is that the Chinese leadership worries less about its vulnerability to a disarming first strike than the costs of an arms race or what some Second Artillery officer might do with a fully armed nuclear weapon. In a strange way, Beijing placed more faith in Washington and Moscow than in its own military officers.

#### Their intenral link ev is about military presence in the south china sea—no reason that will end in the status quo

### Natural Gas

#### No risk of alliances—we’ll always have control over the middle east

#### Energy independence now—solves their internal link

**Donilon 13** – National Security Advisor 2010-2013 in the Obama administration, worked as Executive Vice President for Law and Policy at Fannie Mae (Tom Donilon, “Energy and American Power”, June 15, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139509/tom-donilon/energy-and-american-power)

Energy is a profoundly important aspect of U.S. national security and foreign policy: the availability of reliable, affordable energy is essential to economic strength at home, which is the foundation of U.S. leadership in the world. Scarce resources have driven both commerce and conflict since time immemorial -- and still do today. Energy supplies present strategic leverage and disposable income for countries that have them. The challenge of accessing affordable energy is shared by people and businesses in every country -- young democracies, emerging powers, and developing nations -- allies and adversaries alike. Disruptions in supply in one location can have global economic impacts.

Energy shapes national interests and international relations. It influences politics, development, governance, and the security and stability of the environment. For all these reasons and more, increasing global access to secure, affordable, and clean energy is a national interest of the United States and a top priority for those of us entrusted with U.S. national security. Two recent developments have changed Washington’s approach toward energy: first, the substantial increase of affordable energy resources within the United States affects the country’s economic growth, energy security, and geopolitical position. Second, climate change, driven by the world’s use of energy, presents not just a transcendent challenge for the world but a present-day national security threat to the United States. Both forces should push the United States and other countries toward cleaner, more sustainable energy solutions.

The current optimism about the U.S. energy picture is a relatively new development. Even as recently as 2008, when President Barack Obama took office, energy experts predicted that the United States would need to double its imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the next five years. However, thanks to U.S. innovation and technology, nearly all of those estimates have been turned on their head. U.S. oil consumption peaked in 2005 and has been declining since and alternative energy sources are being developed. Domestic oil and natural gas production has increased every year Obama has been in office -- now at seven million barrels of oil per day, the highest level in over two decades. The International Energy Agency projects that the United States could be the world’s largest oil producer by the end of the decade. And the United States is already the top natural gas producer in the world.

Meanwhile, natural gas imports are down almost 60 percent since 2005, and the U.S. now exports more natural gas than ever to Mexico and Canada. In addition, for the first time in over 60 years, the United States is exporting more refined petroleum products than it is importing. And U.S. energy-related greenhouse gas emissions have also fallen to 1994 levels due in large part to Obama’s success over the past four years in **doubling electricity from renewables**, **switching from coal to natural gas** in power generation, and **improving energy efficiency**.

The new U.S. energy posture and outlook will **directly** strengthen the nation’s economy. As Obama has said, a country’s political and **military primacy** depends on its **economic vitality**. Strength at home is critical to strength in the world, and the **U.S. energy boom** has proven to be an important driver for the country’s economic recovery -- boosting jobs, economic activity, and government revenues. In North Dakota, for example, unemployment has dropped to near three percent, the lowest in the country, and the state has a $3.8 billion budget surplus, largely due to increased unconventional gas and oil production. IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates estimates that the shale gas industry directly or indirectly employed 600,000 Americans in 2010, a number that could double by 2020.

Natural gas production has also sparked a **domestic manufacturing revival**. Manufacturers in energy-intensive sectors, including chemical, steel, plastics, and glass companies, have announced up to $95 billion investments across the United States to take advantage of low-cost natural gas. Furthermore, as a result of U.S. investments in clean energy, tens of thousands of Americans have jobs and the United States is now home to some of the largest wind and solar farms in the world. Domestic economic developments like these improve the country’s world standing and send a **powerful message** that the United States has the resources, as well as the **resolve**, to remain a **preeminent power** for years to come.

The United States’ new energy posture allows Washington to engage in international affairs from a **position of strength**. Increasing U.S. energy supplies acts as a **cushion** that helps **reduce the country’s vulnerability** to global supply disruptions and price shocks. It also affords Washington a stronger hand in pursuing and implementing its international security goals. For example, the United States is engaged in a dual-track strategy that marshals pressure on Iran in pursuit of constructive engagement that addresses global concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. As part of the pressure track, the United States has engaged in tireless diplomacy to persuade relevant nations to end or significantly reduce their consumption of Iranian oil while emphasizing to suppliers the importance of keeping the world oil market stable and well supplied. The substantial increase in oil production in the United States and elsewhere means that international sanctions and U.S. and allied efforts could remove one million barrels per day of Iranian oil from the market while minimizing the burden on the rest of the world. The same approach is being used in Syria today and was used in Libya in 2011.

**Heg causes war and prolif-recalcitrant power balancing takes out the benefits of heg**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

**Extinction**

**Asal and Beardsley 09** (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

**There isn’t actually an impact to expansionsism…the U.S. just wants someone to get mad at**

[Armstrong](http://english.ruvr.ru/by_author/94378709/) 4/18 [Patrick, Analysis, Ottawa, Canada “Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security concerns: it is not threatening nuclear war today – expert” <http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Russia-is-not-very-pertinent-to-Washington-s-strategic-and-security-concerns-it-is-not-threatening-nuclear-war-today-expert/> 2013]//BMitch

Countries enjoy claiming highfalutin values and principles as justification for their often sordid actions. But these principles are usually pretty malleable. Washington, for example, was firm on the principle of inviolability of borders in the Georgian case in 2008 but less so in Yugoslavia in 1999; Moscow firmly held the opposite position each time. Moscow was supportive of the human rights of Ossetians but not so much about those of Kosovars; Washington, again, the opposite. Each was adept at manufacturing reasons why the inviolable principles of one case did not apply in the other.

[This article of part of the Voice of Russia Weekly Experts’ Panel Discussion](http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Are-the-international-stances-of-Russia-and-the-US-inherently-incompatible/)

But it is pleasing to one’s to self esteem to claim high motives. For years Washington has claimed the moral high ground of “democracy” and now we see Moscow claiming to be the home of stability. These noble self-portraits look most convincing at some distance. For Moscow to claim to be the thumb that keeps the scales of world power balanced is to slip over its partial responsibility for the transformation of another Balkan squabble into a world war in 1914 and ignore most of the years between 1917 and 1990. Washington focuses its moral-quizzing glass on Russia rather than say, Saudi Arabia: an “Arab Spring” for Libya but not for Bahrain.

But above this normal level of sanctimony-cloaked interest, the US goes further with its bizarre obsession about Russia. It is bizarre because Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security concerns: it is not [threatening nuclear war](http://www.google.ca/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&oq=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&gs_l=hp.3..0l4.1554.7403.0.7721.29.11.0.18.18.0.102.924.10j1.11.0...0.0...1c.1.9.psy-ab.V8JZOu86HKg&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.) today; nor is Obama [considering using force against it](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/04/biden-aipac-speech-iran-threat); nor does he see it as the [greatest threat](http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/294054/terror-or-iran-romney-obama-clash-over-greatest-threat). Russia has surely seldom appeared in White House threat briefings for a decade and a half. If not a real opponent, then, Russia must fill some other need: a cost-free shadow opponent; a contrast that can be painted as dark as you like; an object of feel-good moral righteousness; a sullen teenager who must be brought to obedience.

Americans seem to need a rival, an opponent, a type of geopolitical chiaroscuro: the light can shine only against the darkness. Russia is large and significant and provides a contrast more substantial than, say, Venezuela.

Because US-Russia trade is pretty inconsequential, Russia is a low-cost object of periodic American fits of moral censure. An issue as trivial as Pussy Riot can be played up as a momentous violation whereas any sustained condemnation of the treatment of Shiites or Pakistani and Filipino servants in Saudi Arabia would come at a cost. Outrage against Russian “occupation” of parts of Georgia is cheap; outrage about Chinese occupation of Tibet is not. Russia’s sins are a perfect fit: giving a pleasing moral superiority without expensive consequences.

Or is Russia an ungrateful child? In the 1990s there was much talk about US aid and advice reforming Russia and some saw it as on the verge of becoming “just like us”. But it didn’t and such back-sliding cannot be forgiven.

And, of course, when you are looking down from a moral prominence, disagreement is sin. Moscow cannot just be disagreeing about the Syrian nightmare; it must be blocking “[the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57467452/clinton-friends-of-syria-must-unite-to-stop-russia-china-blockading-progress/).”

So, the differences do seem incompatible so long as the curious American obsession endures.

As for global realities, how are the last two “humanitarian interventions” working out? The Guardian quotes [reports identifying Hashim Thaçi, put into power by NATO, “as one of the ‘biggest fish’ in organised crime” in Kosovo](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/24/hashim-thaci-kosovo-organised-crime) and the less said about the “success” in Libya, the better. In these two cases, therefore, it doesn’t seem to be Moscow that is out of touch with global realities.

**Middle East war would be short and small-scale**

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

#### No impact to Iran prolif

Waltz 12 – Kenneth was a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and probably the pre-eminent IR scholar of the twentieth century. (“Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb?page=show>)

UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

## 2NC

### Oil

#### TBA would increase drilling in the Gulf and spillover to more production in Mexico as a whole

**Goldwyn 2013** [4/11; David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC; “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf]

On February 20, 2012, the U.S. and Mexico signed a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement that   allows for the joint the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime   boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico.30 If implemented, the agreement   would end the current moratorium on exploration and production in the border area. While the   Mexican Senate ratified the agreement on April 12, 2012, the Obama Administration has not   formally submitted the agreement to the U.S. Congress for passage. The entry into force of this   agreement would render significant benefits for both the U.S. and Mexico.31 It would provide a   means for Pemex to collaborate with private companies in the Gulf of Mexico border area, which   would give Pemex a crucial opportunity to gain expertise in deepwater activities that could be   applied to the firm’s operations throughout Mexico. This would serve U.S. interests by boosting   Mexican production and reducing U.S. dependence on imports from more politically troublesome   regions, which have replaced lagging Mexican exports in recent years.  32 Conversely, U.S.   reticence to implement the agreement may send the wrong signal to Mexico and dampen   enthusiasm for energy sector reform at a time when the stage may be set for historic change.  Indeed, competent implementation of the agreement could demonstrate to Mexico that its   interests can be protected in joint production regimes with U.S. companies and bring about an   impetus for broader Mexican energy reforms.

#### More oil production decreases global prices—especially from the Gulf

**Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2013** [“oil” http://www.c2es.org/energy/source/oil]

Oil prices have historically been volatile and this is likely to continue due to supply disruptions motivated by world politics and shifts in global supply and demand.  Because the oil market is global, any significant conventional oil find anywhere in the world or any technological breakthrough with regard to the recovery of unconventional oil sources that has the ability to meaningfully augment global supply, has the potential to push oil prices down.  The prospects of finding a large conventional oil field within the United States are low, but off-shore (non-conventional) deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico as well as on-land and off-shore regions in Northern Alaska hold the greatest potential.  With a small amount of proven reserves relative to the global quantity, the United States is a price-taker.  However, dramatic changes in U.S. consumption, as evidenced by the economic downturn in 2009 can affect world oil prices.

#### Plan would spark reforms of PEMEX, decreasing global oil prices

**CNN Money 2012** [8/17 “Mexico's big oil problem”]

In 2008, the country's production peaked at 3.2 million barrels a day, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Last year, it didn't even produce 3 million a day. The reason: aging oil fields and years of underinvestment. Industry experts say Mexico could revive production if it allowed more investment from international oil companies. But under current policy, EIA says Mexico will have to start importing oil by 2020. For the United States, the decline in Mexico's oil industry means it will likely be buying more oil from Canada and Saudi Arabia, the No. 1 and No. 2 sources of U.S. oil imports. Mexico is now third. [Related: Wind power hits 57% mark in Colorado](http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/06/news/economy/wind-power-Colorado/index.htm?iid=EL) And because oil is a global market, any drop in production one place could mean higher prices worldwide. The loss of Mexico's current exports of about 1 million barrels a day would be greater than the amount lost due to [sanctions on Iran](http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/10/news/economy/iraq-oil/index.html?iid=EL) -- albeit over a longer time period. Many experts blame the structure of Mexico's oil industry for the decline. Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938. Since then companies such as Exxon Mobil([XOM](http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=XOM&source=story_quote_link), [Fortune 500](http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/387.html?iid=EL)), Royal Dutch Shell ([RDSA](http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=RDSA&source=story_quote_link)) and BP ([BP](http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=BP&source=story_quote_link)) have been prohibited from taking a meaningful stake in the country's oil operations. The state oil giant, Petroleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, has run the show. PEMEX is one of the largest companies in the world, and provides the Mexican government with 32% of its revenues, according to the EIA. But oil exploration requires big investments and Mexican lawmakers have long resisted giving the firm the money it needs to go out and find new sources of crude.

#### Increasing investment in PEMEX would decrease global oil prices

**Crandall 2013** [3/27 Maureen S. Crandall, Professor of Economics in the Eisenhower School, National Defense University “North American’s Energy Boom (will Mexico join?)”

http://www.masterresource.org/2013/03/north-american-boom-except-mexico/#sthash.McP7kCzq.dpuf]

For socialized Mexico, the energy revolution has yet to take off, despite the country’s rich deposits. With proper incentives, Mexico could become an oil and gas powerhouse. Its biggest problems are above ground, in terms of the politics and history surrounding the state oil company PEMEX. The company’s production is declining, starved as it is for capital investment; without investment, Mexico could turn into a crude oil importer. The new government recognizes this as a “signature issue,” and the expectation is that while PEMEX will remain in the hands of the state, it will be allowed to seek development relations with interested foreign oil and gas companies to offset the declines in oil production and to develop shale oil and gas deposits, of which it has many. The country is currently a net crude oil exporter and a net natural gas importer. Mexico presently exports over 80% of its total crude exports to the U.S., all by ship, since there are no oil pipeline connections. But it is a growing importer of gasoline and diesel, which, if it exploits its undeveloped oil resources, it could provide locally. As to natural gas, Mexico continues to increase its pipeline gas imports from the U.S., as well as to buy LNG from a variety of other countries. Since many of Mexico’s promising undeveloped oil and gas resources lie in the north close to Texas, a Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the US and Mexico to guide development has been proposed, but as yet is unsigned. Given the boom in U.S. oil and gas production, Mexico is unlikely to remain a strong oil exporter to the US, and will have to seek future customers elsewhere. North America to the World The renaissance of the North American energy sector is reshaping the world’s energy landscape with far-reaching implications for energy flows and geopolitics. For example, already oil imports from Nigeria and Venezuela to the U.S. are dropping. Middle East oil exports are competing with Nigerian and North African crudes in Europe, which puts downward pressure on the price of Russian oil exports to Europe. Asian gas demand will be met in the future possibly by both U.S. and Canadian new LNG exports, as well as by existing suppliers and new Russian and Australian LNG shipments. The energy boom in North America demonstrates that competition and technology are powerful forces; indeed, markets work. When the price system is allowed to work, technology is brought to bear on supply (more) and demand (less) to the benefit of economies everywhere. In the case of the U.S., oil imports from non-North American sources have fallen precipitously, with implications for both energy import vulnerability and geopolitics. Canada and Mexico, if they are to sustain exports, prices, and returns to production, need more transport infrastructure and need to seek alternative export markets. Moreover, if Mexico is to ensure its energy future, it will have to open oil and gas exploration/production to economic forces, which means a change in the way PEMEX operates. From a U.S. policy perspective, Washington needs to change its import-focused strategies to recognize the value of both oil and gas exports. This means approving the Keystone XL pipeline, opening federal lands, and approving LNG export plans.

#### TBA and PEMEX reforms key to boosting Mexican oil, which is a key component of the world’s supply

US Mexico Leadership Initiative 2012 [“ENHANCING THE U.S. – MEXICO ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf>]

The United States and Mexico are major energy partners. Mexico is one of the   top three sources of U.S. oil imports (along with Canada and Saudi Arabia)—a   standing made possible by the fact that Mexico was the seventh-largest oil   producer in the world and the third-largest producer in the Western Hemisphere in   2011. Despite its status as one of the world’s largest crude oil exporters, Mexico is   a net importer of refined petroleum products from the United States.   PMI, a subsidiary of Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex, has been a 50-  50 joint venture partner in an oil refinery in Deer Park, Texas, since 1993. This   refinery is the sixth-largest refinery in the United States, processing crude oil from   a number of sources, including Mexico, into refined products for use in the United   States and Mexico.   Mexico’s total energy consumption consists of oil (58%), natural gas (30%),   hydroelectric (5%), coal (4%), nuclear (1%), and other renewables (2%).   Natural gas is increasingly replacing oil as a feedstock in power generation.   However, Mexico is a net importer of natural gas, so higher levels of natural gas   consumption will likely depend on more imports from the United States or via   liquefied natural gas.  Mexico’s natural gas pipeline network includes 10 active import connections with   the United States. In 2010, Mexico imported 342 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural   gas from the United States, while it exported 30 Bcf to the United States.  Conventional thermal generation represents the overwhelming majority of   Mexico’s electricity generation, though the mix from these sources is gradually   shifting from oil products to natural gas.  In an effort to strengthen our respective nations’ energy security, the United States   and Mexico signed an agreement on February 20, 2012, for the exploration and   development of oil and natural gas reservoirs along the U.S.-Mexico maritime   boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.   In sum, the energy sector (oil, natural gas, etc.) is of strategic importance to both   the United States and Mexico; particularly because global energy demand is   projected to rise over the next 30 years, in part due to increased demand by nonOECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries   such as China and India.   Mexico has initiated energy reforms that, if carried forward, will help revitalize the   sector, increase Mexico’s energy production, allow for additional growth, boost   revenue, and ultimately provide a better future for Mexico’s next generation.

### K

**Adapting humans to technology results in inequality, dehumanization, and the eclipse of culture**

**ELLUL 1989** (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, What I Believe, Trans. Bromiley, http://www.jesusradicals.com/wp-content/uploads/what.pdf)

Thus one of the great themes today is technological culture. We are supposedly adding technological knowledge to our humanist legacy. At least this is not an attempt to raise technology to the rank of a true culture, to find in it a source of values, intelligence, a critical spirit, a universalism. A technological culture is in fact impossible, for technology is the negation of culture. We find a similar desire to show that technology becomes social inasmuch as it simplifies and amplifies social actions, or that it creates a new art. This is merely playing with words; there is no substance to it. The art created by painters, sculptors, and musicians imitates what technology alone proposes and permits and has nothing in common with what has been produced as art, and called such up to about 1930, since Prehistoric times.2 People are always talking about humanizing technology, but this talk has no effect whatever on its development. All questioning of technology on basic grounds (e.g, by ecology and the ecological movement in its early days) has either been ruthlessly dismissed or integrated into the technological world. This world sometimes seems capable of producing a counterforce, for in the period of transition from one environment to another susceptibilities have to be taken into account. Thus we find the concern for human relations in the 1950s and the movement of technology assessment today. But these simply serve to allay disquiet and thus to make development easier.

The second result of the domination of this environment is that human beings have to adapt to it and accept total change. At issue here is not just a slight modification or adaptation but an essential transformation. A first aspect of this radical adaptation concerns the relation between human beings and machines. If machines have to be perfectly adapted to us, the reverse is unavoidable. We have to be exactly what is useful for machines, **their** perfect **complement**. Human life is no longer merely a matter of muscle and reflex. We now have to have our gadgets. We can see the mutation very clearly and decisively in the academic world. The humanities are now disparaged. Traditional culture is valueless relative to machines. At the beginning of the 20th century, and again in 1930, people in the industrial and commercial world began to ask what good such studies as history and Greek are. How can they help us to make money or to forge ahead economically? Today we are putting much the same question, but in a new way: How do they serve the technological world? How do they make us a proper complement for machines? This is why there is such an incredible stress on information in our schools. The important thing is to prepare young people to enter the world of information, able to handle computers, but knowing only the reasoning, the language, the combinations, and the connections between computers. This movement is invading the whole intellectual domain and also that of conscience.

But this is not the only feature. Part of the human mutation is the appearance and consecration of the human guinea pig in furtherance of science and technology. Since science and technology are plainly dominant, we have to test their effects and usefulness on people. Experiments are becoming ever more numerous and varied. I was horrified many years ago to learn that in the United States, for scientific reasons (to study the evolution of the embryo), pregnant women were being paid to have an abortion at a given stage, and we have gone much further than that today. Remedies, pharmaceutical products, are being tested on people for pay. There is experimentation in the field of what is everywhere called genetic makeup. We are growing used to the idea that people are simply guinea pigs upon whom it is quite legitimate to conduct scientific experiments. "Humanity is our most precious resource" is a slogan that has been taken up in many forms the last few years. But let us remember that if humanity is only a resource, this implies that we may treat humanity as simply a factor in economic production. Leases are taken out on resources. In the genetic field there seems to be no limit to what can be done (implants, test-tube babies, surrogate mothers, etc.). The imagination has free rein. But genetic manipulation is designed to produce exactly the type of people that we need. Much has been made of the book 1984, but what is in prospect is really Huxley's Brave New World. From birth individuals are to be adapted specially to perform various services in society. They are to be so perfectly adapted physiologically that there will be no maladjustment, no revolt, no looking elsewhere. The combination of genetic makeup and educational specialization will make people adequate to fulfill their technological functions.

Beyond that, American experiments directly on the brain have shown that the implantation of minute electrodes (with the consent of the subject) might induce specific impressions, desires, and pleasures, and effect obedience to orders no matter who gives them and with no need for speech. At an experimental stage this has caused no scandal. But is it not apparent that this new form of intervention in human nature will finally suppress human freedom altogether, will bring about complete obedience without choice, and will result in the perfect adaptation that technology needs? People will no longer be a hindrance to proper conduct. The more perfect technology becomes, the more refined and complex and subtle and swift its processes, the more human conduct has to be perfect. We can no longer dream or forget or have other centers of interest. An instrument panel in an automated factory is no place for the recalling of poetry. The technological environment demands a radical transformation of humanity. Previously human adaptation followed the slow rhythm of evolution from generation to generation. Only over centuries did people become social, political, and urban. No one decided for them that they had to follow this pattern. Today the technological environment is coming upon us very quickly. Technology develops with ever increasing speed. In every sector and in all directions the new environment is being formed explosively. Hence human adaptation to it cannot be extended over many centuries. We have to adjust rapidly.

Examination of the last thirty years will be enough to demonstrate this incredible rapidity. Technology cannot wait, for it soon becomes unusable. Everything has to be done in a single generation. Nor can the adaptation be spontaneous, following our physiological and intellectual rhythm. To move quickly, we have to move by act of will. We cannot wait for progressive and cumulative adaptations. We have to create at once the kind of people that machines demand. Human language has already been modified to become that of the computer. Some numbers and letters have been modified so as to correspond exactly to the form that the computer gives them. This is an almost unrecognizable occurrence, yet it is of major importance.

A problem arises, however. For a long time those who have been genetically manipulated so as to conform to the technological model will be a small minority. Most people will still be at the social stage or even the natural stage. What will be the relations between these groups? They will certainly not understand one another. There will be no more in common between them than in the transition from the first to the second stage there was between nomadic brigands and the first city merchants five thousand years ago. On the one hand there will be a kind of aristocracy marked off by its total and infallible adaptation to technical gadgets and the technological system, and on the other hand there will be a vast number of people who are outdated, who cannot use the technology, who are powerless, who are still at the social stage but who live in a technological environment for which they are totally unadapted.

In this respect I must make a final observation. When I talk about adaptation, readers might think that I mean adjustment to various minor differences in environment. Thus people in hot countries adjust their clothes and habits and customs accordingly. But the changes of environment that I have in mind demand a total and fundamental mutation, so that I am inclined to say that the Prehistoric people of the natural environment had nothing in common with the historical people of the social environment, and that we are now witnessing a mutation of the same order. We have only to think how alien the bushmen or aborigines of Australia were to all that the 19th century regarded as human nature. By a change of environment what is regarded as human nature in one epoch is transformed and a new model of humanity emerges. It might be argued that I am exaggerating and that the environment cannot have this impact on human nature. But that argument is a mere hypothesis based on the conviction that there is such a thing as an inalienable and basically identical human nature. For my part, I am not so sure. Furthermore, no one has ever been able to say clearly what this human nature really is.

Nevertheless, I have still to answer a question of my own. Why have I given this sketch of the development of three environments in a book entitled What I Believe? It is true that at a first glance all that I have written here seems to have nothing to do with my fundamental beliefs, with what is fundamentally existential for me. Yet at root what I have presented is not a scientific theory. I cannot prove the impact of the environment or the relation of human beings to it. I do not pretend to be able to give strict answers to the many questions that. confront anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians. I have put forward a simple hypothesis. But all hypotheses include a great deal of intuition and belief. Conversely, all beliefs finally express themselves in hypotheses which will be more or less strict and more or less daring, but which we have to take into account if we are to get the complete picture of an epoch. I would say in fact that this relation of human beings to their environment and these changes of environment do form part of what I believe. And if some disappointed readers are tempted to say: "And is this all that Jacques Ellul believes?" I would reply that what is at issue here is evaluating the danger of what might happen to our humanity in the present half-century, and distinguishing between what we want to keep and what we are ready to lose, between what we can welcome as legitimate human development and what we should reject with our last ounce of strength as dehumanization. I cannot think that choices of this kind are unimportant. What I believe with this theory of three environments has to do very definitely with the need to formulate what kind of humanity we want and what kind we repudiate. The relevance of this aspect of what I believe is by no means negligible.

The way in which we describe policies should be evaluated prior to the results– this does not mean they can’t weigh impacts, rather that our kritik is a prior question– this is the most logical and is vital for policymaking

Neta **Crawford**, **2002**. PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Professor of Political Science @ Brown. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21.

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- **must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place**. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

Policy education from debate is unrealistic – therefore unpredictable and useless

CLAUDE 1988 (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of *policy* and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the *Genesis* theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

Identifying with the state scapegoats it for violence which allows evil to continue

Shaffer 2007 [Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>]

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, [They Thought They Were Free](http://www.amazon.com/They-Thought-Were-Free-Germans/dp/0226511928/lewrockwell/), most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., [Flying Tigers](http://www.amazon.com/Flying-Tigers-John-Wayne/dp/0782011276/lewrockwell/)) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

## 1NR

### Natural gas

#### Proliferation outweighs the affirmative—cuases instability and miscalcuaton and increases the risk of crisis escalation—a world with more nuclear weapons is one in which use of those weapons is more likely—that’s Asal and Beardsely

#### They’ve conceded this—I don’t need ot do much work here—they increase hard power which creates resentment and backlash—states want to create parity with the United States so they develop nuclear weapons and proliferate—that’s Monteiro

**Heg turns china adv**

**Layne 8** \*CHRISTOPHER LAYNE is a professor at Texas A&M University\* George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service [China's Challenge to US Hegemony [Layne, Christopher](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Layne,+Christopher/$N?t:ac=200719835/fulltext/1359B1625E038988947/5&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200719835/fulltext/1359B1625E038988947/5&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks)[107. 705](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.issuebrowselink:searchpublicationissue/41559/Current+History/02008Y01Y01$23Jan+2008$3b++Vol.+107+$28705$29/107/705?t:ac=200719835/fulltext/1359B1625E038988947/5&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) (Jan 2008): 13-18]

THE ACTUAL STRATEGY Engagement and containment are "ideal type" grand strategies toward China. In the real world, Washington's actual approach fashions elements of both engagement and containment into a hardedged grand strategy that requires China to accept US geopolitical and ideological hegemony-or else. In this respect, American policy toward China is the specific manifestation of overall US grand strategy, which rests on both strategic and idealistic pillars. Strategically, the goal of post-cold war us strategy has been to prevent the emergence of new great powers (or, as the Pentagon calls them, "peer competitors"). This strategy was first articulated in March 1992 in the initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance document for fiscal years 1994-1999. It stated that the goal of US grand strategy henceforth would be to maintain America's preponderance by preventing new great powers from emerging. The United States, it declared, "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." The Clinton administration similarly was committed to the perpetuation of US preponderance. And the administration of George W. Bush has embraced the hegemonic strategy of its two immediate predecessors. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States promises that America will act to prevent any other state from building up military capabilities in the hope of "surpassing, or even equaling, the power of the United States." Ideologically, US grand strategy amounts to "realpolitik-plus," to borrow [Brandeis University](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/200719835/fulltext/1359B1625E038988947/5?accountid=465) professor Robert Art's phrase. As such, national interests are defined in terms of both hard power and the promotion of American ideals. As the National security Strategy puts it, US grand strategy is "based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." Some observers have described this formula as "liberal realism," "national security liberalism," or (as neoconservative pundit Charles Krauthammer puts it) "democratic realism." This sort of liberalism is more muscular and offensive than idealistic. The spread of democracy and economic openness are imbedded in American grand strategic thought because policy makers believe that us power, influence, and security are enhanced in a world comprised of "free market democracies." America's post-cold war strategy is based firmly on these twin pillars of military superiority and liberal internationalist ideology. And because domestic ideology is the fundamental driver of US grand strategy, America's geopolitical aims transcend those traditionally associated with power politics. Not only does the emergence of a powerful challenger in general threaten America's ability to control its environment, but China in particular is seen as a threat because its politico-economic system challenges America's need for a world compatible with-and safe for-its own liberal ideology. China's rise threatens to close East Asia to US economic and ideological penetration. LIBERAUZE-OR ELSE Because of ideology, engagement has a role in us strategy, but it is engagement with (bared) teeth. The United States is willing to give China the opportunity to integrate itself into the US-led international order-on Washington's terms. Thus, as a Pentagon document has put it, the United States wants China to become a "responsible member of the international community." Responsibility, however, is defined as Beijing's willingness to accept Washington's vision of a stable international order. As President Bush declared in a November 2005 speech in Kyoto, responsibility also requires China to achieve political liberalization and develop as a free market economy firmly anchored to the international economy. Indeed, us policy makers believe that, over the long term, peaceful relations are possible with Beijing only if China undergoes domestic political and economic liberalization. As a result, the United States aims to promote China's internal transformation. As the Bush administration's National security Strategy declares: "America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness" in China, "because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order." As then-Deputy secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in 2005, "Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society." US officials believe that nations such as China that do not adopt American-style political and economic systems, and that do not play by the rules of the American-led international order, **are ipso facto threats to US interests-threats to which America must be prepared to respond aggressively.** Here is where America's willingness to employ the hard fist of military power against China comes into play The Bush administration has said it "welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China that appreciates that its growth and development depend on constructive connections with the rest of the world." At the same time, however, Washington has made crystal clear that it will not countenance a China that emerges as a great power rival and challenges American primacy. The 2002 National security Strategy enjoins Beijing from challenging the United States militarily and warns that, "In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness." As Washington sees it, China has no justifiable grounds for regarding the us military presence in East Asia as threatening to its interests. ThenDefense secretary Donald Rumsfeld made this point in 2005 when he stated that any moves by China to enhance its military capabilities necessarily are signals of aggressive Chinese intent. According to Rumsfeld, China's military modernization cannot possibly be defensive because "no nation threatens China." Rumsfeld's view was echoed in the administration's 2005 report on The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, which stated that "China's military modernization remains ambitious," and warned that in coming years "China's leaders may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes." Similarly, at an October 2007 conference on Sino-American relations Admiral Timothy Keating, the commander in chief of the US Pacific Command, made three points with respect to America's China strategy. First, the United States will seek to maintain its present military dominance over China. Second, America will, through arms sales, ensure there is a cross-Strait military balance between Taiwan and China. Third, the United States will not allow China to change the status quo in Taiwan by force. In short, the United States is determined both to make sure that China does not emerge as a peer competitor and to impose itself as an obstacle to China's overriding national goal of reunification with Taiwan. STRANGLING THE BABY China's rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the "power transition" effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system-and these challenges have usually culminated in war. Notwithstanding Beijing's talk about a "peaceful rise," an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others' fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to the United States. **Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because US grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy**. For a declining hegemon, "strangling the baby in the crib" by attacking a rising challenger preventively-that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily-has always been a tempting strategic option. AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN Washington, however, faces perhaps a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influential American scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy, the United States should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes that Washington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power. The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing perceptions that this power represents a threat. As an onshore balancer in East Asia, the United States would embrace a new set of policies regarding Sino-American economic relations, political liberalization in China, the defense of Taiwan, and America's strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require the United States to approach economic relations with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the flow of high technology and direct investment from the United States to China. It also would require a shift in current US trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is a de facto American subsidy of the very economic growth that is fueling China's great power emergence. Second, the United States would abandon its efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to transform China domestically, the primary effect of trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame Sino-American relations. An offshore balancing strategy also would require a new US stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue because China is committed to national reunification and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. If us policy fails to prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the conflict because of its current East Asia strategy. There would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of US intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would constitute aggression and undermine US interests in a stable world order, powerful incentives for intervention would also arise from ideological antipathy toward China, concerns for maintaining US "credibility," and support for a democratic Taiwan in a conflict with authoritarian China. Notwithstanding these arguments, which are underpinned by a national security discourse that favors American hegemony, the issues at stake in a possible showdown between China and Taiwan simply would not justify the risks and costs of US intervention. Regardless of the rationale invoked, the contention that the United States should go to war to prevent Beijing from using force to achieve reunification with Taiwan (or in response to a unilateral declaration of independence by Taipei) amounts to nothing more than a veiled argument for fighting a "preventive" war against a rising China. SHARING THE BURDEN The final element of a US offshore balancing strategy would be the devolution from the United States to the major powers in Asia of the responsibility for containing China. An offshore balancing strategy would rely on the balance-of-power dynamics of a twenty-first century multipolar global order to prevent China from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in Asia-Japan, Russia, and India-have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States. In a multipolar system, the question is not whether balancing will occur, but which state or states will do the heavy lifting. Because the United States is geographically distant from China-and protected both by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean and by its own formidable military (including nuclear) capabilities-the United States has the option of staying out of East Asian security rivalries (at least initially) and forcing Beijing's neighbors to assume the risks and costs of stopping China from attaining regional hegemony. Because its air and naval power is based on long-range strike capabilities, the United States can keep its forces in an overthe-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely event that the regional balance of power falters. It is hardly surprising-indeed, it parallels in many ways America's own emergence as a great power-that China, the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging America's present dominance in East Asia. However, this poses no direct threat to US security. Japan, India, and Russia, on the other hand, are worried about the implications of China's rapid ascendance for their security. They should bear the responsibility of balancing against Chinese power. **An incipient drift toward multipolarity-which is the prerequisite for the United States to adopt an offshore balancing strategy-is already apparent in East Asia**. Driven by fears of US abandonment in a future East Asian crisis, Japan has embarked on a buildup of its military capabilities and has even hinted that it is thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the past several years have seen a significant escalation in tensions between China and Japan, fueled both by nationalism and by disputes over control of the South China and East China seas (which may contain large energy deposits). From the standpoint of offshore balancing, Japan's military buildup in response to its fear of China is a good thing if it leads to Japan's reemergence as an independent geopolitical actor. However, Japan's military resurgence is not so good (for the United States) if it takes place under the aegis of the US-Japan security alliance, and if the United States remains in the front lines of the forces containing China. Under those conditions, the United States could find itself ensnared in an Asian conflict; its alliance with Japan risks dragging it into a war with China in which American strategic interests would not be engaged. The idea of an offshore balancing strategy is to get the United States out of China's crosshairs, not to allow it to remain a target because of its present security commitments to allies in the region. The wisdom of risking war with China to maintain US hegemony in East Asia is all the more doubtful because America's predominance in the region is ebbing in any event. One indication of this is that US economic supremacy in East Asia is waning as China rises. China is emerging as the motor of the region's economic growth. While the United States has been preoccupied with Iraq, Iran, and the so-called war on terrorism, China has used its burgeoning economic power to extend its political influence throughout East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, most of the smaller states in Southeast Asia are gradually slipping into Beijing's political orbit because their own prosperity is ever more closely tied to their relations with China. America's strategy of trying to uphold the geopolitical status quo in East Asia clashes with the ambitions of a rising China, which has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying to contain China, the potential for future tension-or worse-in SinoAmerican relations can only increase. By pulling back from its hegemonic role in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States could better preserve its relative power and strategic influence. It could stand on the sidelines while that region's great powers enervate themselves by engaging in security competitions. THE TEMPTATION OF POWER If American strategy were determined by the traditional metrics that have governed the grand strategies of great powers-the distribution of power in the international system, geographic proximity of rivals, and military capabilities-China would not be considered much of a threat to the United States. The wellspring of US grand strategy lies elsewhere, however: in Wilsonian ideology. This is why the United States remains wedded to a strategy of upholding its predominance in East Asia, as well as in Europe and the Middle East. One of the few ironclad lessons of history is that great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed-and defeated-by the counterbalancing efforts of other states. Yet the prevailing belief among the American foreign policy community is that the United States is exempt from the fate of hegemons. This belief, really a form of American exceptionalism, is wrong. If Washington gives in to the temptation of hegemonic power, dangerous times lie ahead.

#### There’s no impact to this advantage—middle east war won’t escalate because each actor in the middle east has an interest in stability—they wouldn’t allow it to escalate—that’s especially true in the context of an oil scenario—if China has oil interests in the Middle east, they wouldn’t want the middle east to be instable

#### Middle East war would be short and small-scale

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

#### I don’t’ really know what the other impact to this advantage is—they might have some asinine alliance argument but no one really knows what their argument is—heg turns that because it alienates allies and makes effective cooperation impossible

### China

#### No impact to war in the south china sea—a few warranwts

#### Economic ineterdependence

#### Chinese instability—the ccp and the pla

#### Chinese socialization

That’s the moss evidence

**No escalation – they can’t get their nukes off the ground before we’d destroy them**

**Lewis 05**, research fellow @ CISS & Cooperative Security Program Post- Doctorate fellow @ U of Md, 2005 (Jeffery, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No 3 Vol 61 p 52, accessed through Galileo)

So, let's review: China deploys just 30 ICBMs, kept unfueled and without warheads, and another 50-100 MRBMs, sitting unarmed in their garrisons. Conventional wisdom suggests this posture is vulnerable and invites preemptive attack during a crisis. This minimal arsenal is clearly a matter of choice: China stopped fissile material production in 1990 and has long had the capacity to produce a much larger number of ballistic missiles." The simplest explanation for this choice is that the Chinese leadership worries less about its vulnerability to a disarming first strike than the costs of an arms race or what some Second Artillery officer might do with a fully armed nuclear weapon. In a strange way, Beijing placed more faith in Washington and Moscow than in its own military officers.

#### Recent evidence proves there will be cooperation – code of conduct

**Mead 4-12**-2013 (Walter Russell Mead is James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine. “Good News from the South China Sea” <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/04/12/good-news-from-the-south-china-sea/>) BW

Representatives from ASEAN and China have agreed to talk about a code of conduct in the South China Sea, Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told reporters today. That’s great news, especially because the meeting was China’s idea, according to Natalegawa. If true, this is a departure from Beijing’s usual stonewalling when it comes to working out territorial disputes.

We don’t have the full story yet, and there are no guarantees that China and ASEAN countries will agree on anything at the ASEAN conference later this month. But this is definitely a step in the right direction.

Over the past few months, China has antagonized one neighbor after another, aggressively asserting its claims to disputed territory and refusing to negotiate with other claimants. As a result, China has driven almost every single neighbor away, forcing them into the relative security of each other’s (and America’s) warm embrace. Perhaps that’s changing, but it will take more than a promise to talk before we believe it.

**Further US presence in the SCS causes war**

**Klare 2-21**-2013 (Michael is Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College. “The United States Heads to the South China Sea” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139023/michael-t-klare/the-united-states-heads-to-the-south-china-sea>) BW

The growing involvement of U.S. energy companies in the extraction of oil and natural gas from the South China Sea has added another layer to the United States' strategy. According to a recent report from the U.S. Department of Energy, major firms such as Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil have partnered with the state-owned oil companies of Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines to develop promising reserves in maritime territories claimed by these countries as well as China. In October 2011, for example, Exxon announced a major gas find in waters claimed by Vietnam that are also said to be part of China's own maritime territory.

For years, these obligations and interests were taken only half-seriously. In the George W. Bush years, and early in the Obama years, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominated White House policymaking, allowing the administrations little time to think about maritime strategy in East Asia. That left a rising China virtually unchecked to assert indisputable rights to contested islands in the region and to use military force to back up its words. On several occasions, the Chinese navy thwarted rivals' efforts (which had often been undertaken in conjunction with U.S. firms) to explore oil and gas prospects in areas they claimed. In May and June 2011, for example, Chinese ships reportedly severed the exploration cables of seismic survey ships owned by PetroVietnam, which has partnered with ExxonMobil and other foreign firms to search for oil and gas in the South China Sea. According to documents released by WikiLeaks, Exxon has been warned by China to suspend its cooperation with PetroVietnam. As is typical, there has been little or no official U.S. response to China's actions.

In 2011, with U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, President Barack Obama began to address the perceived decline in America's regional power position. Claiming that the Asia-Pacific region had become the new center of global economic dynamism, Obama set out to restore military dominance there. This meant, first and foremost, the reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Pacific, especially the Navy, which is slated to deploy 60 percent of its combat strength in the region (as compared to 50 percent at present); but, as Obama explained, it also entailed the reinvigoration of military ties with U.S. allies in the region, especially Japan and the Philippines. Although Obama has insisted that this so-called pivot to Asia was not intended to punish or contain China, it is hard to view it as anything else.

Hence, while continuing to profess neutrality, senior officials have expressed dismay over the aggressive actions taken by certain unnamed claimants -- easily interpreted as meaning China. In a July 2011 talk in Indonesia, Hillary Clinton, who was then secretary of state, declared that "all of us have a stake in ensuring that these disputes don't get out of control, and in fact, the numbers have been increasing of intimidation actions, of ramming [and] cutting of cables" -- an obvious reference to acts said to have been taken by Chinese ships against Filipino and Vietnamese oil-exploration vessels.

And, as China did earlier in the decade, the United States has been backing up its words with military strength. It has promised additional arms aid and military training to allies that have since shown greater assertiveness in the island disputes. In April 2012, for instance, Manila deployed a 378-foot frigate, the Gregorio del Pilar, to waters off Scarborough Shoal (claimed by both China and the Philippines) after a Filipino surveillance plane spotted what was thought to be illegal Chinese fishing activity in waters around the shoal. The frigate, a former U.S. Coast Guard cutter equipped with an array of modern weapons, is the first of several vessels that the United States has provided the Philippines under a recent aid agreement. Japan, which has received fresh assurances of continuing U.S. military support, has also increased the size and muscularity of its naval presence in waters claimed by China. At the same time, the United States has increased the frequency and scale of its naval exercises in the region -- usually in partnership with longtime allies such as Japan and the Philippines but also with former foe Vietnam.

From the perspective of the region's major actors, then, the United States can hardly be viewed as a neutral, disinterested party. In China's eyes, it is partisan in the island disputes and an obstacle to achieving China's legitimate objectives. Indeed, many in China believe that Washington is actively spurring Japan and the Philippines to assume a more assertive stance on the disputed territories as a way of constraining China's rise. This, in turn, is feeding distrust and resentment of the United States, and increasing the likelihood that future incidents at sea -- however they are provoked -- could spark a clash between Chinese and U.S. vessels. For the other actors, the United States is a source of moral succor, military aid, and, if things ever get totally out of control, direct combat support. In other words, regardless of whether it was Obama's intention when he pivoted to the Pacific, he has surely increased the chances that rash and potentially incendiary behavior by any one of the countries hashing it out in the South and East China seas could lead to war.

#### They might ttry to make a distinction between the south china sea and china war overall—that won’t happen either—massive econoimic ties between the two countries means that china and the US both have a distincentive to go to war—that’s Ackerman—they hold a ton of our bonds and we buy a ton of their manufactured goods

#### Zero risk of war

**Citing Dibb, 4-23**

[Nicholson, Staffer at the Australian, Citing Paul Dibb, Prof Emeritus at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defense Studies Centre. “Talk of US-China war 'is a dangerous miscalculation'” The Australian, 4/23/13 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/talk-of-us-china-war-is-a-dangerous-miscalculation/story-e6frg8yo-1226626378665> //GBS-JV]

The emeritus professor at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre says a major war between China and the US is unlikely, though a minor conflict that could be contained is possible if territorial disputes escalated. "Is China going to be the dominant military power in our region any time in the foreseeable future?" he will ask. "The answer to that is no."¶ And should the US therefore make strategic space to allow China to have a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia?¶ "The answer to that is also no," he will say.¶ Professor Dibb will say analysts need to understand China's weaknesses before beating the drum about its military power. It has been noted that China is a fragile superpower highly dependent on trade, and "If you go to war, any guarantees of international trade continuing vanish overnight," he will say. "While China is developing its military, it is not the former Soviet Union and it is not exporting revolution and it is most unlikely to invade other countries."¶ While there may be incidents at sea between Chinese and Japanese warships that could involve the Americans, Professor Dibb does not believe such incidents will trigger a full scale war.¶ The nations involved are aware that such a conflict is likely to turn nuclear and their economies are so interlinked that they simply cannot afford to let it happen.

#### China NFU means no first strike

**Zhenqiang 05** (Pan, Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of the People’s Liberation Army of China , retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons”, China Security (World Security Institute China Program, <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403>]

In my view, No-First Use (NFU) has been a theoretical pillar of China’s nuclear policy. This rationale of NFU of nuclear weapons serves Beijing’s foremost security interests. It also contributes to the maintenance of world strategic stability. There are at least five reasons to explain why China has consistently stuck to that principle, and will continue to do so in the future.  
Underlying Principles  
First, NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed, their extremely large destructive capabilities render nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose.   
From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states. This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused. On the contrary, China’s nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time. It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense. Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the in efficiency of conventional capabilities vis-à-vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states. And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large. If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it?

**We would stop them from using weapons if they wanted to**

**Lieber and press 06** – Keir A. Leiber, author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania ("The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006)

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's, entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones. Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades. Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia. Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.